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DIVINE KNOWLEDGE AND
QUALITATIVE INDISCERNIBILITY
Daniel S. Murphy

This paper is about the nature of God’s pre-creation knowledge of possible
creatures. I distinguish three theories: non-qualitative singularism, qualitative singularism, and qualitative generalism, which differ in terms of whether
the relevant knowledge is qualitative or non-qualitative, and whether God has
singular or merely general knowledge of creatures. My main aim is to argue
that qualitative singularism does not depend on a version of the Principle of
Identity of Indiscernibles to the effect that, necessarily, qualitatively indiscernible individuals are identical. It follows that qualitative singularism does
not depend on the view that possible creatures categorically have qualitative
individual essences.

1. Introduction
This paper is about the nature of God’s pre-creation knowledge of
possible creatures. By “possible creatures,” I have in mind non-divine individuals (such as persons, pieces of matter, etc.). By God’s “pre-creation”
knowledge, I mean the knowledge God has prior to creating any such
individuals. If God has a temporal mode of existence, the word “prior”
can be taken in a straightforward temporal sense, and I assume there was
a time at which there were no creatures and never had been any. If God
has an atemporal mode of existence, “prior” can be taken in some sort
of logical or metaphysical sense. Inasmuch as God timelessly acts on the
basis of some sort of knowledge of what he might timelessly do, we can
ask about the nature of that knowledge. I assume a robust conception of
creation, on which God’s creating something involves bringing about its
existence (or being, etc.), as opposed to merely conferring some property,
such as “actuality,” on an antecedently existing (or real, etc.) thing. I also
assume that something must exist if it is to stand in a relation. So, God’s
pre-creation knowledge of a creature cannot consist in the holding of any
cognitive relation between God and that individual. For were God to bear,
prior to creation, such a relation to that individual, he would know, prior
to creation, that it exists (or will exist, or “will” exist), in which case he
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would not be in a position to decide whether to create it.1 So what, then,
does the relevant knowledge consist in?
This is my topic. My main aim is to defend a theory of pre-creation
knowledge on which such knowledge is both qualitative and singular. This
kind of theory, which I will call qualitative singularism, has been advanced
before,2 but attached to metaphysical views that many find implausible. I
will argue that qualitative singularism can be severed from these attachments. Specifically, I will argue that it does not depend on a qualitative
version of the “Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles” to the effect that,
necessarily, individuals with identical qualitative properties are numerically identical. It follows that qualitative singularism does not imply that
possible creatures categorically have qualitative “individual essences.” If
I am right, the prospects for qualitative singularism are enhanced, since
there is good reason to reject the relevant version of the identity of indiscernibles. And it would be good for qualitative singularism’s prospects to
be enhanced, for alternative theories face problems—or so I will suggest,
without pretending to refute them.
2. Preliminaries
Suppose God creates a piece of matter, Matt. What is the nature of God’s
pre-creation knowledge of Matt? Though it cannot consist in God’s bearing
any relation to Matt, it could consist in his bearing a relation to some sort
of proxy, p, for Matt. The idea would be that p, unlike Matt, exists prior to
creation, and is such that God’s bearing a particular relation to it intuitively constitutes knowledge of Matt. It is not clear that this sort of account
of God’s pre-creation knowledge of something, on which such knowledge
consists in his bearing a relation to a proxy or “stand-in” for it, is the only
sort that might be developed. However, it has precedent,3 and I find it congenial for my purposes in this paper. What might be a proxy for Matt? An
initially natural thought is that such a proxy will be an individual essence
of Matt (hereafter I may elide the word “individual”), by which I mean a
property the having of which is necessary and sufficient for being Matt.
With this proxy account of divine knowledge in hand, I now want to
draw two distinctions between kinds of theories.
1
There are complications here due to possible views about God’s relation to time, the nature of the time to which he is related, the relation between relations and time (e.g., whether
a relation’s relata need exist at the same time), and whether there can be facts “prior to” God’s
knowing them. Our assumed conception of creation implies that no creature exists-prior-tocreation, i.e., is “located there.” However, one might think this is consistent with its being the
case, prior to creation, that a creature exists (by virtue of being located at a later time), or will
exist, or “will” (in an irreducibly metaphysical sense) exist. Thanks to a referee for getting me
to sharpen the text’s argument, which is designed to accommodate all the relevant subtleties.
2
For example, by Leibniz (see Adams, “Primitive Thisness and Primitive Identity,” 9–13)
and, more recently, Linda Zagzebski (“Individual Essence and the Creation”).
3
This sort of account was employed by Aquinas and others (see Zagzebski, “Individual
Essence and the Creation,” 135–136, 142–143; and Menzel, “Temporal Actualism and Singular
Foreknowledge,” 479–487), and for more recent executions, see, in addition to Zagzebski and
Menzel themselves, e.g., Kvanvig, The Possibility of an All-Knowing God, 122.
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There is an intuitive distinction between qualitative and non-qualitative
properties, relations, and propositions (or facts, or states of affairs). Let
us call anything that is a property, relation, or proposition a matter. It is
commonly said that non-qualitative matters “involve” or are “about”
particular concrete particulars in some sort of direct way. This gloss suggests that non-qualitative matters include, for example, the property of
being Obama, the relation of sitting next to Biden earlier than, and the
proposition that Obama and Biden are five feet apart; and that qualitative
matters include, for example, the property of being blue, the proposition
that there are two individuals that are five feet apart, and the proposition
that sphericity is instantiated.4
However, I think directly involving a particular concrete particular
is merely sufficient for a matter’s being non-qualitative. Consider the
property of being Matt, or of being identical to Matt. Call this an identity
property.5 Identity properties for individuals are non-qualitative. Now let
us say that a haecceity would, were there such things, be a primitive property the having of which determines the possessor’s being the very entity
it is.6 If Matt has a haecceity, it would not be its identity property, but
something the having of which explains its having its identity property. I
think haecceities for individuals would be non-qualitative (one may even
be tempted to use the word “non-qualitative” in explicating them), but it
is not clear that they directly involve particular individuals.
We may not need informative necessary and sufficient conditions for
a matter’s being qualitative or non-qualitative. For one thing, we might
take the distinction to be primitive.7 Perhaps we can go some way toward
better elucidating it by invoking the idea of universality or generality.8
Intuitively, the reason a haecceity for an individual would fail to be qualitative is that it would be both (a) equivalent with the identity property
of an individual and (b) primitive, i.e., such that its instantiation would
not consist in anything further. Relatively simple qualitative properties
like being blue or being five feet away from something are multiply-exemplifiable, and hence fail to satisfy (a). And while a qualitative essence of
an individual would satisfy (a), it would presumably fail to satisfy (b),
4
The words “qualitative” and “non-qualitative” are not always used to get at the distinction I am after. For example, Katherine Hawley extends “non-qualitative” to matters
involving the identity and parthood relations (“Identity and Indiscernibility,” 102). On this
use, not only is the proposition that Obama and Biden are five feet apart “non-qualitative,”
but the proposition that there are two individuals that are five feet apart is too. Alternatively,
one might use “qualitative” as an adjectival form of “quality” (see Paul, “Building the World
From Its Fundamental Constituents.”). On this use, a trope would be a “qualitative” entity,
whereas on mine, no particular is qualitative or non-qualitative.
5
Robert Adams calls identity properties of individuals “thisnesses” (see, e.g., his “Primitive Thisness and Primitive Identity,” 6).
6
Cf., e.g., Adams, “Actualism and Thisness,” 12–18; Cover and O’Leary-Hawthorne, Substance and Individuation in Leibniz, 278; and Lowe, “Individuation,” 86–89.
7
Adams, “Primitive Thisness and Primitive Identity,” 9.
8
Ibid., 7–8.
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since it would presumably be a rather complex property the instantiation
of which consists in the instantiation of simpler, multiply-exemplifiable
qualitative features. But by virtue of a haecceity’s satisfying (a) and (b),
there seems to be no generality or universality about it, even if it would
not directly involve any individuals per se. For present purposes, however,
it should suffice to say that any matter that directly involves a particular
concrete particular or a haecceity for one, or that is such a haecceity, is
non-qualitative.
We can apply the qualitative / non-qualitative distinction to theories of
pre-creation divine knowledge in the following way. On the qualitative
theory, such knowledge is categorically qualitative, in the sense that the
proxies with which God is acquainted are categorically qualitative matters. For example, one might think God is acquainted with qualitative
essences of creatures. On the non-qualitative theory, the relevant knowledge
is at least partly non-qualitative, in the sense that at least some proxies are
non-qualitative. For example, one might think God is acquainted with nonqualitative essences of creatures, such as identity properties or haecceities.
The second distinction I want to focus on is that between singularist and
generalist theories of pre-creation knowledge.9 On the singularist theory,
the relevant knowledge is categorically singular, whereas on the generalist theory, it is at least partly merely general (hereafter I will elide the
word “merely”). Consider Matt again. As a first pass, we might say that
the difference between God’s having singular knowledge and his having
general knowledge of Matt turns on whether the knowledge that constitutes knowledge of Matt conflates Matt with another possible creature. If it
does, it is general, and it is singular otherwise. And an initially intuitive
way to make sense of whether the knowledge conflates Matt with another
possible creature is in terms of whether Matt and any other possible creature share a proxy. If so, God’s pre-creation knowledge conflates Matt with
another possible creature, resulting in general knowledge of Matt.10
Though I take the singularist / generalist distinction and the qualitative / non-qualitative distinction to be orthogonal, I see no reason to adopt
See Menzel, “Temporal Actualism and Singular Foreknowledge.”
Strictly speaking, there are no merely possible creatures to have proxies. Suppose we take
proxies to be properties possibly had by that for which they proxy. If P proxies for Matt, we
may make sense of the sentence “Matt and a merely possible creature share P as a proxy”
in terms of the claim that P is both possibly such that Matt has it and possibly such that
something x that is not Matt has it. If P is like this, acquaintance with P constitutes general
knowledge of Matt. But if P is necessarily such that anything that has it is Matt, acquaintance
with P constitutes singular knowledge of Matt. Since Matt exists, we can now talk about
God’s having had, prior to creation, knowledge of Matt. But it may be more faithful to the
pre-creation state of things to say that, prior to creation, acquaintance with P constitutes singular or general knowledge of a possible creature (or creatures). We may make sense of “prior
to creation, two possible creatures share P as a proxy” in terms of the claim that, prior to
creation, P is possibly such that something x both has P and is possibly such that something y
that is not x has P. If P is like this, acquaintance with P constitutes general knowledge of some
possible creatures. But if P is possibly such that something x both has P and is necessarily
such that anything y that has P is x, acquaintance with P constitutes singular knowledge of
a possible creature.
9

10
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non-qualitative generalism. For if non-qualitative knowledge of possible
creatures is granted, there seems to be no barrier to singular knowledge.
So I see the main contenders as non-qualitative singularism, qualitative
singularism, and qualitative generalism. Though I will say a bit about
why one might be unsatisfied with the first and third, my main aim is to
defend the second from an objection.
Although I find the topic of this paper of intrinsic philosophical interest,
let me say a bit about why it matters. First, I have argued elsewhere that
Molinism depends on singularism.11 The basic idea, very roughly, is that
there could not be true subjunctive conditionals of creaturely freedom (in
a libertarian sense) for types of possible creatures, but only for particular,
token ones. So, if God is to grasp true conditionals of the relevant kind
prior to creation, he must have singular knowledge of possible creatures
prior to creation. Second, one might think generalism threatens the integrity of some divine attributes, such as God’s knowledge and power.
Prima facie, it seems that generalism implies that, prior to creation, the
domain of what is possible outstrips, in some sense, the domain of what
is divinely conceived, or apprehended, or entertained, etc. As such, it
looks as if, prior to creation, there are some possibilities of which God
is ignorant and incapable of intentionally actualizing.12 Third, the topic
of pre-creation divine knowledge of individuals is intimately connected
with metaphysical issues concerning both the natures of individuals
themselves and the ontological grounds of modal facts about them.13 As
such, theists interested in these metaphysical issues may find the present
topic particularly interesting.
Here is the plan for what follows. In §3, I will say a bit about why one
might find the non-qualitative theory unsatisfactory. In §4, I will raise a
challenge for qualitative singularism concerning the apparent falsity of a
particular version of the identity of indiscernibles, and explain how this
might seem to motivate qualitative generalism. In §5 and §6, I will argue
that qualitative singularism is in fact consistent with the relevant principle’s falsity. I will wrap up in §7.
3. Against the Non-qualitative Theory
One reason to prefer the qualitative theory is that it is easier to see how the
relevant proxies could exist prior to creation.14
Let us consider a version of the non-qualitative theory on which the
proxies are identity properties of creatures. An identity property directly
Murphy, “Molinism, Creature-types, and the Nature of Counterfactual Implication.”
Christopher Menzel defends generalism from this kind of objection (see “Temporal Actualism and Singular Foreknowledge,” 498–502).
13
I borrow the phrase “ontological grounds” from a referee.
14
Some work on this issue with which I will not directly interact includes Zagzebski,
“Individual Essence and the Creation,” 135–143; Menzel, “Temporal Actualism and Singular
Foreknowledge,” 489–491; Plantinga, “On Existentialism”; and the exchange between Kit
Fine and Alvin Plantinga in Alvin Plantinga.
11
12
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involves the entity that would have it, were it instantiated. What I will
say about this view, however, can be applied to any version of the nonqualitative theory on which the proxies directly involve creatures. (For
example, consider the property of being the product of sperm s and egg
e, or the proposition that Obama exists.) This view constitutes a version
of non-qualitative singularism on which there is a one-to-one correspondence between proxies and creatures: every creature has just one proxy,
and (more saliently) no creatures share a proxy.
Being Matt
Being Obama
Being Biden

→
→
→

Matt
Obama
Biden

Let us consider Matt’s identity property, i.e., being Matt. What is the nature of this property? Let us first suppose that the existence of being Matt
partly consists in the existence of Matt itself. One way to develop this is to
suppose that being Matt has Matt as a constituent. For example, perhaps
the property is somehow built out of the identity relation and Matt. Or
perhaps the property is to be understood as the set of its instances, i.e.,
{Matt}. Alternatively, perhaps the existence of being Matt partly consists in
that of Matt for reasons unrelated to the property’s ontological structure.
For example, Robert Adams maintains that an identity property depends
for its existence on that of its possessor, because what it is to be the identity
property of a given entity is to stand in a particular relation with that entity
(requiring that it exist).15 So take being Matt. This has the property of being
the identity property of Matt, and this looks like an essential property of it.
Further, it seems that having the property of being the identity property of
Matt consists in bearing a relation to Matt, requiring that Matt exist. So, it
seems that the existence of being Matt partly consists in that of Matt.
Now if the existence of being Matt partly consists in that of Matt, it fails
to constitute a viable proxy for Matt. For prior to creation, the matter itself
does not exist, from which it seems to follow that, prior to creation, the
property does not.16
Let us now suppose that the existence of being Matt does not partly consist in that of Matt. As I construed Adams’s argument for the conclusion
that an identity property depends for its existence on that of its possessor,
there were two premises:
Adams, “Actualism and Thisness,” 11.
One might challenge this inference on the basis of the thought that Matt’s post-creation
existence suffices for being Matt’s pre-creation existence. (Cf. Kvanvig, “Adams on Actualism
and Presentism.”) But this would not render the property a viable proxy. For the proxy must
not only exist, but also be grasped by God, prior to creation. But if the proxy’s pre-creation
existence were underpinned by Matt’s post-creation existence, it would not be grasped prior
to creation. For if God grasped it prior to creation, he would be aware, prior to creation, of its
dependence on Matt’s post-creation existence, in which case he would not be in a position to
decide whether Matt is to exist.
15
16
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(1) Being Matt has being the identity property of Matt essentially.
(2) Having being the identity property of Matt consists in bearing a relation to Matt.
However, one might deny (1) by maintaining that all that is essential to
being Matt is that it is the identity property of Matt if anything—or in other
words, if it is possessed at all.17
Now if the existence of being Matt does not partly consist in that of
Matt, being Matt would seem to constitute a viable proxy in this sense:
were there such a thing, it would exist prior to creation. However, now
it is by no means clear that there is any such property. If Matt is put in
front of me, I am initially sanguine with countenancing the existence of a
property perspicuously expressed by the phrase “being Matt.” But I think
this is because I am initially inclined to take the existence of the relevant
property to partly consist in that of the individual that it involves and that
is ostensibly before me. This kind of perspective generalizes and may be
naturally taken to underlie the kind of casual talk about non-qualitative
properties and relations (exhibited in §2) in which it is taken for granted
that there are such things. They can be taken for granted, it seems to me,
because of their constitutive connection with the individuals they involve
and that are taken for granted. Now perhaps there are, in addition to nonqualitative features of this sort, non-qualitative features of another sort
that—we may suppose—can also be picked out with the same kinds of
names (e.g., the phrase “being Matt,” “sitting next to Biden earlier than,”
etc.) and whose existence does not partly consist in that of the individuals
they involve. But we have yet to see reason to think so.
If the existence of being Matt would not partly consist in that of Matt,
we might think we are talking about a haecceity (see §2). Matt’s haecceity
would be equivalent with being Matt, and, like being Matt on the current
conception, would not be essentially had by Matt, but only essentially had
by Matt if anything. Further, being Matt would, on the current conception,
be a primitive property, for were its instantiation to consist in something
further, that would presumably be the proxy. To be sure, I introduced
haecceities as distinct from identity properties, but the distinction may
collapse on certain conceptions of the latter’s nature. After arguing that
identity properties depend for their existence on that of their possessors,
Adams acknowledges that one might resist his argument by construing
identity properties as haecceities, the non-existence for which he has separate arguments.18
It is not my intention here to argue against the existence of haecceities,
or—if one wants to distinguish them—of primitive “identity properties”
whose existence would be independent from that of their possessors. My
aim has been, not to refute the non-qualitative theory, but to highlight a
17
18

Plantinga, “On Existentialism,” 5.
Adams, “Actualism and Thisness,” 12–18. See also e.g., Lowe, “Individuation,” 88.
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consideration that can be raised against it, the power of which may vary
depending on one’s own metaphysical leanings. The problem, as I see it,
is this: the theory needs proxies that would, were they to exist at all, exist
prior to creation; and yet, for any candidate conception of the proxies,
the plausibility that they would be like this is inversely proportional to
the plausibility that they exist at all. If the candidate proxies’ existence is
bound up with that of (non-divine) individuals themselves, then while
there plausibly are such things, they are not around prior to creation. On
the other hand, if the candidate proxies have an existence independent
of that of individuals themselves, then (to repeat my leanings) it is unclear that there are such things.19 And of course, it would be illegitimate
to equivocate here, relying on one conception of the proxies in motivating
their general existence and switching to another in motivating their precreation availability—or alternatively, to rely on a vague conception that
inhibits an adequate examination of the general existence question or the
pre-creation availability question in the first place.
4. The Qualitative Theory and Qualitative Indiscernibility
Insofar as one finds the pre-creation existence of non-qualitative essences
of creatures problematic, it may be natural to consider a theory of precreation divine knowledge on which God is acquainted with qualitative
essences. For example, suppose there are two qualitative properties, being
F and being G, each of which is essential to Matt, and the conjunction of
which is sufficient for being Matt. Acquaintance with such an essence,
namely being F and G, would intuitively constitute singular knowledge of
Matt. Generalizing to other possible creatures, we get qualitative singularism. If we assume that anything that has a qualitative essence has just one,
we get a version on which there is a one-to-one correspondence between
proxies and creatures. (Alternatively, we might grant that something has
multiple qualitative essences, but select one as its proxy.) On this view, we
can take the instantiation of a creature’s identity property to consist in that
of its qualitative essence, and simply reject the existence of haecceities.
Now a powerful and well-known problem confronts this view. The
view that possible creatures categorically have qualitative essences implies the following version of the so-called “Principle of the Identity of
Indiscernibles”:
(PII) Necessarily, for any individuals x and y, if x and y have identical
qualitative properties, then x and y are identical.
19
See Rosenkrantz, Haecceity, for a defense of the existence of haecceities. Ironically (in
the present context), however, Rosenkrantz denies that God could grasp them (220–224). Cf.
Cover and O’Leary-Hawthorne, Substance and Individuation in Leibniz, 278. Propositions might
be invoked as proxies instead of properties, and what I have said in this section about nonqualitative properties could be extended to non-qualitative propositions. See Plantinga, “On
Existentialism,” for a defense of the view that non-qualitative propositions have an existence
independent of that of the individuals they involve; and for recent work on this issue, see
e.g., Speaks, “On Possibly Nonexistent Propositions.”
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And the problem is that PII is very likely false, or so many philosophers
think.
The following kind of situation can exhibit why PII seems false and
why it is implied by the idea that possible creatures categorically have
qualitative essences.20 Consider a world (i.e., a maximal way for reality
to be) in which two iron spheres come to exist ex nihilo at some spatial
distance from each other, persist unchanged for five seconds, and then
wink out of existence. Suppose they have identical qualitative properties,
intrinsic and extrinsic. For example, both are iron, spherical, a particular
distance from something iron and spherical, etc. This qualitative identity
can be intuitively grasped in terms of the spheres’ being divided by an
axis of spatial symmetry, such that each is a “mirror image” of the other.
Let the word “Alef” denote such a world, and “Castor” and “Pollux” its
two spheres.
Alef
C

P

Castor and Pollux satisfy, in Alef, the antecedent but not the consequent
in PII. So, if Alef is a possible world (i.e., possible maximal way for reality
to be), PII is false. Now, there admittedly are ways of trying to save PII
from apparent counterexamples like Alef,21 and it is not my intention to
establish its falsity. My main interest in PII is to argue that qualitative singularism does not depend on it, and PII’s controversial status is enough to
render this significant. So I will assume that Alef is possible and PII false.
To see how PII’s falsity precludes the categorical possession of qualitative essences by possible creatures, consider Castor in Alef. Since Pollux
has all of Castor’s qualitative properties, there is no qualitative property
(however complex) the having of which is sufficient for being Castor, and
hence no qualitative property the having of which is necessary and sufficient for being Castor. (Mutatis mutandis with Pollux.)
Now where do we go from here? This largely depends on what further
metaphysical implications we take PII’s falsity to have.
Adams seems to take PII’s falsity to imply that “thisness hold[s] a place
beside suchness as a fundamental feature of reality.”22 It is not entirely clear
what this means, but I think the following is not unfaithful to Adams. Let
20
Cf. Black, “The Identity of Indiscernibles”; and Adams, “Primitive Thisness and Primitive Identity.”
21
For three tactics, see Hacking, “The Identity of Indiscernibles”; O’Leary-Hawthorne,
“The Bundle Theory of Substance and the Identity of Indiscernibles”; and Hawley, “Identity
and Indiscernibility.” See Hawley also for general discussion. For a defense of PII in the
context of defending qualitative singularism, see Zagzebski, “Individual Essence and the
Creation.”
22
Adams, “Primitive Thisness and Primitive Identity,” 5 (cf. “Actualism and Thisness,” 3).
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us say that thisness is fundamental just in case it is possible that there are
some non-qualitative matters that do not consist in any qualitative ones,
or less elliptically, just in case there are possibly some non-qualitative matters the instantiation of which (in the case of properties or relations) or
the holding of which (in the case of propositions) does not consist in the
instantiation or holding of any qualitative matters. Adams also thinks that
PII’s falsity implies, or at least suggests, that as a general matter, i.e., prescinding from symmetric worlds like Alef and individuals like Castor and
Pollux therein, identity properties of individuals are distinct from qualitative properties, though he is unwilling to affirm that, as a general matter,
they are non-equivalent with them.23
One might be inclined to draw more from PII’s falsity than does Adams.
For example, Christopher Menzel seems to take PII’s falsity to imply, or at
least strongly suggest, that virtually no possible contingent being has a
qualitative essence.24
Menzel’s argument goes roughly as follows.25 For any possible world
w, let w-minus be a sub-maximal state of affairs that is like w except that it
omits “spatiotemporal totality facts,” by which I mean facts to the effect
that w’s spatiotemporally located individuals are all the individuals so located. For example, consider a world containing just a cube. The relevant
sub-maximal state of affairs would omit the fact that the cube is all that
exists in space and time, and hence may be compossible with, for example,
the existence of another individual five feet away from the cube. Now for
any possible world w, we can take there to be an “expanded” possible
world v that consists of two duplicates (i.e., intrinsic qualitative copies)26
of w-minus, “appended” in such a way as to result in a counterexample
to PII. Further, we can suppose that one of v’s “halves” contains w’s individuals. For example, letting w be a world with a single sphere, v will be a
two-sphere world containing w’s sphere.

w
A

v
A

B

Finally, for any such counterexample to PII, we can take there to be a “contracted” possible world u that consists of a duplicate of w-minus containing
the individuals from v’s other half.

23

5).

Adams, “Primitive Thisness and Primitive Identity,” 13 (cf. “Actualism and Thisness,”

24
See Menzel, “Qualitative Essences and a Final Defense for Plantinga”; and cf. Menzel,
“Temporal Actualism and Singular Foreknowledge,” 492–493.
25
Cf., e.g., Hawthorne, “Causal Structuralism,” 374. Curiously, Menzel attributes the argument to Adams (“Primitive Thisness and Primitive Identity”).
26
Cf. Lewis, On the Plurality of Worlds, 61–62.
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u

A

B

B

If we accept this argument, then for virtually any possible world, we
can get a duplicate possible world containing different individuals.
(The view that there are duplicate but distinct possible worlds has been
called haecceitism. Antihaecceitism, by contrast, is the view that there are
no pairs of worlds that are duplicates and distinct and both possible.27)
This implies that virtually no possible creature has a qualitative essence.
For example, take me in the actual world. If there is a duplicate possible
world that contains a different individual in my “qualitative role,” no
qualitative properties I have are such that having them is sufficient—and
hence necessary and sufficient—for being me.
Now let us return to pre-creation divine knowledge. We started by
considering a version of qualitative singularism on which there is a oneto-one correspondence between proxies and creatures, the proxies being
qualitative essences of that for which they proxy.
E1
E2
E3

→
→
→

Matt
Obama
Biden

PII’s falsity undermines this, for it implies that at least some possible
creatures lack qualitative essences. Now a prima facie natural move, at this
point, would be to stick with the qualitative theory, stick with the idea
that proxies are properties possibly had by that for which they proxy, but
jettison the singularism. This can be done by supposing that proxies are
properties that, in some cases, fail to constitute essences.28 For example, let
F be a very specific qualitative property had by Castor in Alef. Despite F’s
specificity, it fails to constitute an essence of Castor, since Pollux has it too.
Nevertheless, one might think F can proxy for Castor, i.e., that pre-creation
acquaintance with F can intuitively constitute knowledge of Castor. Of
course, if F proxies for Castor, it presumably proxies for Pollux too. Accordingly, the earlier entertained one-to-one correspondence between
proxies and creatures breaks down when it comes to Castor and Pollux.
Castor

F

27
28

Pollux

See Skow, “Haecceitism, Anti-haecceitism and Possible Worlds.”
Cf. Menzel, “Temporal Actualism and Singular Foreknowledge,” 497.
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This intuitively results in God’s having, prior to creation, general as opposed to singular knowledge of Castor: inasmuch as God’s knowledge
of Castor is constituted by acquaintance with F, this knowledge seems to
conflate Castor with another creature, i.e., Pollux.
I defined singularism (in §2) as the view that God’s pre-creation knowledge of creatures is categorically singular, and generalism as the view that
it is in some cases general. While rendering singularism and generalism
jointly exhaustive, this also implies that there can be versions of generalism that differ in terms of the extent to which the relevant knowledge is
general. If we take proxies to be properties possibly had by that for which
they proxy, we can understand this in terms of the extent to which proxies
fail to constitute essences. Menzel advocates qualitative generalism,29 and,
as we have seen, seems to favor a version on which the generality is quite
pervasive. Adams seems to advocate qualitative generalism,30 and, as we
have seen, is more agnostic about the extent of generality.
So, if one rejects PII, one might accept some version of qualitative generalism. Alternatively, one might embrace non-qualitative singularism:
if God is acquainted, prior to creation, with non-qualitative essences for
Castor and Pollux, he has singular knowledge of them prior to creation.
I reject both of these responses, and maintain that PII’s falsity is consistent with qualitative singularism. There are two key steps to seeing
how this is so, which I will elaborate upon in the next two sections respectively. They are closely related, but one can be seen as straightforwardly
metaphysical, while the other arises when we turn to pre-creation divine
knowledge itself. As for the metaphysics, PII’s falsity does not imply the
fundamentality of thisness: even in possible worlds like Alef, we can coherently maintain that all non-qualitative matters consist in qualitative ones.
As for the theology, we can abandon the idea that proxies are uniformly
properties possibly had by that for which they proxy. If we give this up,
we can reject a one-to-one correspondence between proxies and creatures
(which PII’s falsity does require) without giving up singularism.
5. Metaphysics
We may say something of the form
What it is for it to be that φ is for it to be that ψ,
where the letters “φ” and “ψ” are sentence-variables. Such a claim expresses what we might call a “real definition.”31 Replacing “φ” and “ψ”
with closed sentences yields a real definition of a proposition, namely that
expressed by what replaces “φ”. For example: what it is for it to be that
Menzel, “Temporal Actualism and Singular Foreknowledge,” 494–495.
Adams, “Actualism and Thisness,” 9–10. This passage is naturally taken to espouse
qualitative generalism as opposed to singularism when read in light of Adams’s judgments
about qualitative essences and the fundamentality of thisness (see, e.g., ibid., 3, 5).
31
See Rosen, “Metaphysical Dependence: Grounding and Reduction,” 122–123.
29
30
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a city exists is for it to be that . . . . Replacing “φ” and “ψ” with open
sentences yields a real definition of a property or relation. For example:
what it is for it to be that x is a city is for it to be that x is . . . (where the
letter “x” is a variable, not a constant). So claims of real definition express
real definitions of propositions, in the sense of conveying what it is for
them to hold, or of properties or relations, in the sense of conveying what
it is to instantiate them. We can connect talk of real definition with that of
“consisting in” by saying that, if a matter has a real definition in terms of
others, the former consists in the latter.
We can ascribe a qualitative essence to something by positing a qualitative real definition for its identity property. For example, consider Matt.
We can ascribe a qualitative essence to it through a claim of the form
What it is for it to be that x is Matt is for it to be that ψ(x);
where “ψ(x)” is replaced with a qualitative sentence in which the variable
“x” is free. For example, supposing there are two qualitative properties,
being F and being G, each of which is essential to Matt, the conjunction
of which is sufficient for being Matt, the property of being F and G is a
qualitative essence of Matt. We can say
What it is for it to be that x is Matt is for it to be that x is F and G.
And we could ascribe qualitative essences to Castor and Pollux through
claims of the form
(*C ) What it is for it to be that x is Castor is for it to be that ψ(x)
(*P) What it is for it to be that x is Pollux is for it to be that ψ(x),
in which “ψ(x)” is replaced with a qualitative sentence in which “x” is free.
But of course, there are no such truths, since no qualitative property is such
that having it suffices for being Castor (Pollux).
It might seem to follow that Castor’s and Pollux’s identity properties do
not consist in qualitative matters. But it does not.
Here is one way to see this. Let us allow a claim of real definition to
be plural as opposed to singular on the side of the definiendum and/or
the definiens. For example, this kind of claim is plural on the side of the
definiendum:
What it is for it to be that φ1 and φ2 is for it to be that ψ.
Now many definiendum-plural real definitions may hold by virtue of a plurality of definiendum-singular ones. For example, one of the form
What it is for it to be that x is human and y is equine is for it to be that
ψ(x, y)
(the italics emphasizes the plural as opposed to singular-and-conjunctive
character of the definiendum) might hold by virtue of two real definitions
of the forms
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What it is for it to be that x is human is for it to be that ψ(x)
What it is for it to be that x is equine is for it to be that ψ(x).
For intuitively, what it is for a pair of entities to be such that one is a human
and the other a horse just boils down to what it is, on the one hand, for
something to be a human, and on the other, for something to be a horse.
However, we might think there can be irreducibly (definiendum-)plural
real definitions, i.e., plural real definitions that do not hold by virtue of a
plurality of singular ones. Examples might include something in the vicinity of one or more of these:
What it is for it to be that x is a pitcher and y is a catcher is for it to be
that ψ(x, y)
What it is for it to be that x is a lock and y is a key is for it to be that ψ(x, y)
What it is for it to be that x is an x-axis and y is a y-axis and z is a z-axis
is for it to be that ψ(x, y, z).32
And, I want to suggest, there may be a plural real definition of the form
What it is for it to be that x is Castor and y is Pollux is for it to be that
ψ(x, y)
in which the definiens is qualitative. If there is, then inasmuch as there is no
real definition of the form *C or *P in which the definiens is qualitative, we
would have an irreducibly plural qualitative real definition of the spheres’
identity properties.
The intuitive idea is that, though there is no qualitative property the
having of which constitutes what it is to be Castor (Pollux), there may be
a qualitative relation the instantiation of which by two entities constitutes
what it is for them to be Castor and Pollux. If there is, I think it follows that
the spheres’ identity properties consist in qualitative matters.33 Though
the spheres would lack individual qualitative essences, the relevant relation would constitute what we might call a collective qualitative essence
for the spheres.34 For specificity, here is an example of what such a real
definition might look like. Let “F ” be a monadic qualitative predicate satisfied both by Castor and by Pollux in Alef that captures their intrinsic
qualitative character, and “R” a dyadic qualitative predicate satisfied by
Castor and Pollux that captures their extrinsic qualitative character. “R”
comprehends the spheres’ spatial separation, as well as spatiotemporal
totality facts to the effect that they are alone. Now consider:

I owe the first two examples to Harold Hodes and Derk Pereboom respectively.
This line of thought undermines, I think, Rosenkrantz’s argument for haecceities from
the “problem of individuation” (Haecceity, chap. 2), though I have not directly engaged his
argument.
34
Cf. Fine’s notion of “simultaneous definition” (“Ontological Dependence,” 282–284) or
“relational essence” (“Senses of Essence,” 65–66).
32
33
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(**) What it is for it to be that x is Castor and y is Pollux is for it to be that
x is F & y is F & x and y are R.
Let Q be the relation constituting the definiens, that is, a relation a pair of
entities stands in just in case, by definition, they are individually F and
jointly R. If ** is true, Q’s instantiation by a pair of entities constitutes what
it is for them to be Castor and Pollux.35
This brings us to Menzel’s argument for the pervasive non-existence
of qualitative essences for individuals. If sound, this would establish the
possibility of a duplicate of Alef devoid of Castor and Pollux.
Alef
C

Shmalef
P

A

B

And were there such a possible world, ** would be false. For in this other
world, Q would be instantiated by a pair of entities other than Castor and
Pollux, in which case Q’s instantiation by a pair of entities would not be
sufficient for their being Castor and Pollux. And the same would go for
any qualitative relation. So, Menzel’s argument challenges the existence,
not only of individual qualitative essences for creatures, but of collective
qualitative essences for them too.
Since we are granting Alef’s possibility, let us start with that world.
In the first step of the argument, we infer the possibility of an expanded
four-sphere world, v, containing Castor and Pollux. In the second step,
we infer the possibility of a contracted two-sphere world, u (or Shmalef),
containing v’s other two spheres. However, if we accept **, we should reject
the first step. Though there may well be a possible duplicate of v, there
would be no possible duplicate in which two of the spheres are Castor
and Pollux. For given **, a pair of entities’ standing in Q is necessary for
their being Castor and Pollux, and Q is not instantiated in v. (Recall that Q
comprehends totality facts to the effect that there are only two spheres.)36
35
I defend the coherence of this sort of irreducibly plural real definition at greater length,
and in a different context, in my “On the Possibility of Symmetry-breaking Determination”
(unpublished manuscript). It is important that we not take the relational predicate “R” and
the relation Q to be satisfied or instantiated by their relata in a certain “order.” (Cf. Fine’s
notion of a “strictly symmetric” relation [“Neutral Relations,” 17].) For just as no qualitative
property is such that having it suffices for being Castor (Pollux), no “directed” qualitative
relation is such that one entity’s “bearing” it “to” another suffices for the first’s being Castor
(Pollux) and the second Pollux (Castor). The idea behind ** is that two entities’ being individually F and jointly R full stop, not in any order, suffices for one’s being Castor (Pollux) and
the other Pollux (Castor).
36
This way of responding to instances of Menzel’s argument is perfectly general, whether
individual or collective qualitative essences are in the cross-hairs: one can invoke qualitative
necessary conditions for being a particular creature x (or, for a plurality of entities’ being
particular creatures x1, x2, etc.) to resist what I have called the “first step” in the argument.
A referee claims that our ability to resist a Menzel-style attack on individual qualitative essences in this way “would severely restrict the implications of the falsity of PII and make
the author’s project less urgent.” For “[i]f nearly every possible creature has a qualitative
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I noted in §4 that Menzel’s argument uses PII’s falsity to attack antihaecceitism. There are other ways of doing this too. The following argument
for haecceitism can basically be found in Adams.37 Recall that, in Alef,
Castor and Pollux exist for five seconds. Let us expand Alef in the temporal
dimension by supposing Castor exists for ten seconds instead of five, and
let us expand Alef again by supposing Pollux does instead. Call these expanded worlds “Bet” and “Gimel.”
Alef
Bet

Gimel
C

C

P

P
C

P

Bet and Gimel are distinct duplicates. So, if possibility is preserved through
the expansions, they constitute a pair of possible distinct duplicates.
This is a powerful argument for haecceitism. However, unlike Menzel’s argument, its soundness would not undermine the view that Castor
and Pollux have a collective qualitative essence. Alef and Shmalef would
violate antihaecceitism by virtue of having disjoint domains of individuals, whereas Bet and Gimel would violate antihaecceitism by virtue
of distributing qualitative roles across a common domain of individuals
differently. In the former case, the individuals in either world could not
have a collective qualitative essence, since any candidate qualitative
real definiens would be instantiated by different individuals in the other
world. But in the latter case, there may be a candidate qualitative real
definiens that is instantiated by the same individuals in both worlds. To be
sure, if we take Q’s instantiation to imply that the relata exist for exactly
five seconds, Bet’s and Gimel’s possibility would undermine **. But we
could modify the definiens by, for example, eliminating some specificity
so as to render its instantiation consistent with a multiplicity of “possible
individual essence, then God can just restrict his attention to those.” Now, I noted in §4 that
there are kinds of generalism that differ as to the extent of generality in God’s knowledge,
and one might indeed try to defend a rather minimal form, such as by maintaining that only
PII-violating worlds contain individuals lacking individual qualitative essences. First, however, I think the notion of a collective qualitative essence is crucial for adequately motivating
the view that possible creatures tend to have individual qualitative essences. For without this
notion, it is natural to think that PII-violating worlds contain individuals with irreducibly
non-qualitative identities. And given the natural thought that the identities of individuals
in these worlds are not of a radically different sort than those of individuals in other worlds
(e.g., consider a two-sphere world whose spheres slightly differ in size), it becomes natural
to extrapolate to possible creatures generally. Second, if my argumentation in §6 is cogent,
the notion of a collective qualitative essence salvages singularism.
37
Adams, “Primitive Thisness and Primitive Identity,” 22–23. Cf., e.g., Kment, “Haecceitism, Chance, and Counterfactuals.”
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futures,” resulting in a collective qualitative essence that is instantiated in
Alef, Bet, and Gimel.
Let us take stock. I have argued that, though PII’s falsity implies the
possible existence of individuals lacking qualitative essences, it does not
imply the fundamentality of thisness, for the identity properties of the
relevant individuals may yet consist in qualitative matters. And one way
to see this, I have argued, is to see that a collection of individuals each of
which lacks an individual qualitative essence may together have a collective qualitative essence. I have also explained how PII’s falsity might be
taken to indirectly threaten the existence of collective qualitative essences,
by being used to attack antihaecceitism. And I have argued that, on one
way of doing so, collective qualitative essences can be used to resist the
attack itself; and that, on another way, collective qualitative essences are
not threatened.38
6. Theology
Suppose Castor and Pollux have some sort of collective qualitative essence, and let R be the relevant qualitative relation. And let F be a very
specific qualitative property shared by Castor and Pollux in Alef. We saw
earlier that a generalist might take F to constitute a proxy for Castor and
Pollux. This instantiates the broader approach of taking proxies to be properties possibly had by that for which they proxy. But let us depart from this
and take the relation R to constitute a proxy for both Castor and Pollux.

38
A referee identifies an apparent tension between Bet’s and Gimel’s possibility and the
non-fundamentality of thisness. If Bet and Gimel are possible, it seems there are possibly
non-qualitative propositions that do not consist in qualitative matters. In particular, since
Bet and Gimel have identical qualitative truths but distinct non-qualitative ones, it seems
that any non-qualitative proposition over which they differ (e.g., that Castor outlives Pollux)
could not consist in qualitative truths. More generally, it seems haecceitism implies thisness’s fundamentality. Now, I have not argued that thisness is not fundamental per se, but
that its fundamentality is not implied by PII’s falsity. For there are PII-violating worlds (e.g.,
Alef) all of whose non-qualitative matters can be coherently taken to consist in qualitative
ones. This is all we need to get the sort of collective qualitative essence on which my present
defense of qualitative singularism’s consistency with PII’s falsity turns. However, there are
potential objections to my argument (which there is no space to adequately explore here)
that turn on the alleged deliverance of thisness’s fundamentality by “Adams-style” candidate
counterexamples to antihaecceitism (e.g., the pair of Bet and Gimel) (cf. note 42). First, I
have not granted the genuineness of any such candidate counterexamples per se, but rather
admitted their prima facie intuitive power and argued that they do not threaten collective
qualitative essences—unlike “Menzel-style” candidate counterexamples (e.g., the pair of
Alef and Shmalef), which do. Second, though I am willing to grant that Bet’s and Gimel’s
possibility would imply thisness’s fundamentality, given §4’s gloss of it, I do not think that
their possibility would imply that “thisness” constitutes a “fundamental feature of reality”
in a sense that threatens qualitative singularism. (In my “Qualitativism, Haecceitism, and
Time” [unpublished manuscript], I discuss this sort of threat to antihaecceitism, as well as
what it would be for non-qualitative matters to be fundamental, at greater length.) Let me
just point out here that, if Castor and Pollux have a collective qualitative essence, non-qualitative propositions over which Bet and Gimel differ (e.g., that Castor exists for ten seconds)
will be “ultimately qualitative,” where a proposition p is ultimately qualitative if the identity
property of any constituent of p by virtue of which p is non-qualitative (e.g., Castor) has a
qualitative real definition.
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Castor

F

Pollux

Castor

R

Pollux

In so doing, we follow the generalist in rejecting a one-to-one correspondence between proxies and creatures, but—I want to say—without
embracing generalism. God’s acquaintance with R intuitively constitutes
singular knowledge of Castor and of Pollux.
I suggested in §2 that whether some pre-creation knowledge constitutes
general knowledge of a possible creature x can be understood in terms of
whether that knowledge conflates x with any other possible creature y.
And I said a prima facie intuitive way of making sense of whether this
is so is in terms of whether x and y share a proxy. Now I want to refine
this. If a proxy P for something x is a property possibly had by x, I think
that, if P is also possibly had by something y that is not x, acquaintance
with P constitutes general knowledge of x. However, if P is not a property
possibly had by that for which it proxies, it is by no means clear that P’s
proxying for multiple creatures suffices for the relevant knowledge’s being
general. For example, if P is a relation constituting a collective qualitative
essence, I think acquaintance with it constitutes singular knowledge of all
the creatures that would instantiate it. In the case of a property proxy, a
one-many relationship between it and creatures intuitively signifies a lack
of specificity in the divine knowledge. But in the case of a relation proxy, a
one-many relationship between it and creatures may be traced to the fact
that the relevant creatures are essentially connected.
Suppose Matt has a qualitative essence, G. God’s acquaintance with
G constitutes singular knowledge of Matt, and it seems to me that, by
the same token, acquaintance with R constitutes singular knowledge of
Castor and of Pollux. For just as G is such that its instantiation by something would suffice for that entity’s being a particular creature, namely
Matt, R is such that its instantiation by two entities would suffice for those
entities’ being a particular pair of creatures, namely Castor and Pollux.
The point may be reinforced by juxtaposition. Suppose Alef and Shmalef
were both possible, such that R failed to constitute a collective qualitative
essence. In that case, God’s acquaintance with R would fail to constitute
singular knowledge of any possible creatures, for it would intuitively conflate some, such as Alef’s spheres and Shmalef’s spheres.
It might be objected that, even if acquaintance with R does not conflate Alef’s spheres with any other pair of possible creatures, it still fails
to constitute singular knowledge of any possible creatures, by virtue of
conflating Castor and Pollux themselves. My initial reaction is simply to
deny the charge. Again, contrast R with F: acquaintance with the latter
does constitute general knowledge of Castor and of Pollux. And contrast
the view that R is an essence with the view that it is not: on the latter view,
acquaintance with R would constitute general knowledge of Castor and
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of Pollux. However, it may help to consider some other objections that
may be seen as constituting different ways of advancing this “conflation”
claim.
It might be said: God’s acquaintance with R does not enable him to
distinguish Castor and Pollux; so, acquaintance with R does not constitute singular knowledge of them. Call this the direct objection, since the
premise directly posits a cognitive limitation. But what does the word
“distinguish” mean in the premise? If we understand the ability to distinguish something x and y in terms of the ability to recognize that x and y
would, were they to exist, be distinct as opposed to identical, two rather
than one in number, then the premise is false: acquaintance with R does
enable God to distinguish Castor and Pollux, for in grasping R he grasps
sufficient conditions for the distinctness of the would-be relata, such as
their would-be spatial separation. But suppose we understand the ability
to distinguish something x and y in terms of the ability to grasp some “distinguishing mark” or “differentia” that x and y respectively essentially
and impossibly exemplify (or vice versa). This will be a property that x
and y respectively essentially and impossibly have (or vice versa).
Supposing Alef were actual, there would be no qualitative differentiae
between Castor and Pollux, i.e., no qualitative property that Castor and
Pollux respectively essentially and impossibly have (or vice versa). There
would admittedly be non-qualitative differentiae between them, such as
being Castor and being Pollux. However, none of these differentiae between
them would be deep, where by a deep differentia between two entities
I mean a differentia between them that does not consist in any matters
that are not differentiae between them. These differentiae would not be
deep, for their instantiation would consist in that of R. Now if there are
no deep differentiae between Castor and Pollux to be grasped, and God
does grasp that in which any differentiae between them consist, I think
the direct objection fails. Perhaps the inference is bad: if there are no deep
differentiae between two creatures to grasp, it may be that an inability to
distinguish them does not imply a lack of singular knowledge. Or perhaps
the premise is false: if God grasps that in which any differentiae between
two creatures consists, perhaps he can distinguish them. Recall the basic
idea behind a proxy account of knowledge: acquaintance with an existent
entity (a proxy) constitutes knowledge of a non-existent entity (that which
is proxied). Now it seems that if acquaintance with an essence constitutes
knowledge of that which would have it, such acquaintance also constitutes
knowledge of the identity property of that which would have that essence.
For example, acquaintance with Matt’s qualitative essence G constitutes
knowledge, not just of Matt, but also of being Matt. So perhaps acquaintance with R constitutes knowledge of being Castor and being Pollux, in
which case God may grasp differentiae between Castor and Pollux. However we understand the direct objection’s flaw, the fact that it is flawed
may be reinforced by juxtaposition. Consider a view on which R is not a
collective essence, on which Castor’s and Pollux’s identity properties are
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deep differentiae between them, and on which these properties do not
exist prior to creation. Call this view “generalism*.” On generalism*, God
is unable to distinguish Castor and Pollux prior to creation in a way that
does compromise singular knowledge.
It might be said: God’s acquaintance with R does not enable him to
intentionally create just Castor, or alternatively, just Pollux; so, acquaintance with R does not constitute singular knowledge of them. Call this the
indirect objection, since the premise directly posits a limitation in power,
which is intuitively supposed to signify a cognitive limitation. I grant the
premise but deny the inference. Since R constitutes an irreducibly collective essence of Castor and Pollux, it is impossible for just one of these
very spheres to exist. For just as anything has an individual essence essentially if at all, anything participates in an irreducibly collective essence
essentially if at all.39 To be sure, the idea that something is impossible does
not, in and of itself, imply that God’s inability to bring it about does not
constitute a lack of power—and hence does not imply that the inability
does not signify a cognitive limitation. (For example, suppose something
is impossible partly because God cannot bring it about.) However, since we
are deriving collective essences from real definitions (cf. §5), the relevant
impossibility is squarely rooted in the nature of Castor and Pollux,40 and
so the relevant inability does not signify a cognitive limitation. On generalism*, by contrast, it may be possible for just Castor to exist, and yet God
is unable to intentionally bring this about. (The most God could do would
be to intentionally bring it about that such and such a kind of individual
exists, which could turn out to be Castor.) On this view, God’s inability to
intentionally create just Castor does signify a lack of singular knowledge.41
Let us take stock. I argued in §5 that, even if Alef is possible and PII
false, it is coherent that the identity properties of Castor and Pollux would,
39
Suppose Matt and Fred respectively have qualitative essences being G and being H. If
Matt can co-exist with Fred, we can ascribe them a collective qualitative essence with the
sentence “what it is for it to be that x is Matt and y is Fred is for it to be that x is G & y is H.”
But such an essence is not irreducibly collective. And if Matt can exist without Fred, it is not
essential to Matt that it participates in this collective essence.
40
See, e.g., Aquinas, Summa Theologica I, q. 25, art. 3.
41
It might be said that, prior to creation, it is not possible that just Castor exists, because,
prior to creation, there is no such proposition to be possibly true (see, e.g., Adams, “Actualism
and Thisness,” 10). But this would not be to the point (see Menzel, “Temporal Actualism
and Singular Foreknowledge,” 499–500). Singularists and generalists can agree that, prior
to creation, there are no creature-involving propositions to be possibly true, but also that it
is possible that such propositions come to exist and acquire truth. As far as possibility goes,
what is relevant is whether it is possible that particular creature-involving propositions come
to exist and acquire truth. As far as power goes, what is relevant is whether God can do
things such that, were he to, the existence and truth of particular creature-involving propositions would necessarily result. If R is a collective essence, acquaintance with it enables God
to do something, namely actualize its instantiation, such that, were he to, the existence and
truth of the proposition that (e.g.) Castor exists would necessarily result. It is in this sense
that, prior to creation, God can intentionally actualize the proposition that Castor exists,
or intentionally create Castor. On generalism*, by contrast, God cannot intentionally create
Castor (a fortiori, just Castor) in this sense.
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were they to exist, consist in qualitative matters, and I argued that one
way of making sense of this is through the idea that the spheres, though
lacking qualitative individual essences, would participate in a qualitative
collective essence. In this section, I have defended the conditional claim
that, if the spheres would indeed participate in such an essence, God’s
pre-creation acquaintance with it would constitute singular knowledge of
them. If I am right, PII’s falsity is consistent with qualitative singularism.
Though debate about the conditional claim could no doubt continue,42
space is limited, and I think enough has been said to establish, at a
minimum, its prima facie plausibility. I want to suggest that any intuitive
resistance to the conditional ultimately boils down either to resistance to
the antecedent or to a failure to adequately appreciate its significance (or
both). For intuitively, if the spheres’ identity properties would indeed consist in qualitative matters, acquaintance with some such matters ought to
suffice for singular knowledge of the spheres. And to be sure, my aim in
these two sections has not been to argue that the spheres’ identity properties would in fact consist in qualitative matters, but to argue for the
coherence of the view that they would (in §5) and to make the connection
with pre-creation divine knowledge (in this section).
7. Conclusion
I have been working with an account of pre-creation divine knowledge
of possible creatures on which such knowledge consists in God’s being
acquainted with proxies or “stand-ins” for creatures, and I have distinguished three theories, namely non-qualitative singularism, qualitative
singularism, and qualitative generalism, which differ in terms of whether
the proxies are qualitative or non-qualitative, and in terms of whether acquaintance with them constitutes singular or merely general knowledge
of creatures. In §3, I raised a problem for non-qualitative singularism concerning the pre-creation “availability” of the alleged proxies. In §4, I raised
a problem for qualitative singularism concerning the apparent falsity of a
particular version of the Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles, and explained how the problem might seem to motivate qualitative generalism.
In §5 and §6, I argued that qualitative singularism is consistent with the
relevant principle’s falsity. The argument turned on two claims: the principle’s falsity does not rule out the view that the identity properties of the
relevant individuals would consist in qualitative matters; and a creature’s
proxy need not be a property possibly had by it.
Though I think these considerations go some way toward enhancing
the plausibility of qualitative singularism relative to its competitors, my
42
In particular, it would be fruitful to consider revised versions of the direct and indirect
objections in which the premises are revised so as to involve, not Castor and Pollux per se,
but particular Castor- and Pollux-involving states of affairs (such as Bet and Gimel—see §5).
I also think it would be fruitful to consider objections that turn on distinctively Molinist ideas
(thanks to a referee here), or more generally, to explore the relationship between Molinism
and qualitative singularism sans PII.
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main purpose has not been to argue for qualitative singularism per se, but
to free it from some alleged metaphysical commitments that (in my view)
have dragged it down. Qualitative singularism stands apart from qualitative generalism and non-qualitative singularism in maintaining a firm
commitment to the metaphysically derivative nature of non-qualitative
aspects of reality; the latter two theories mainly diverge over whether allegedly fundamental non-qualitative matters are divinely graspable prior
to creation. As such, a full-orbed case for qualitative singularism would
involve a positive case for the exclusive fundamentality of qualitative
matters. However, though I have not made that case here, in arguing that
such a view does not depend on the relevant version of the identity of
indiscernibles (in §5), I have tried to disarm a major objection to it.43
Cornell University
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